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The Mormon Question: Polygamy and Constitutional Conflict in
Nineteenth Century America.  By Sarah Barringer Gordon. University of 
North Carolina Press, 2002.  337 pages.  $19.95.
Sarah Barringer Gordon has written a balanced and readable 
history.  There are, as expected, descriptions of key events in the 
development of the Mormon church.  We are reminded of the 
founding of the church by Joseph Smith in 1830.1  There is a brief 
recounting of the tensions that arose between the early Mormons 
and their neighbors in certain Midwestern states, culminating in 
Smith’s murder by an angry mob in 1844.2  The ensuing migration 
to the Great Salt Lake Basin under the leadership of Brigham 
Young was followed by the “Mormon Reformation” circa 1857, 
during which the doctrine of blood atonement was espoused and 
      † Anthony S. Winer is a Professor at William Mitchell College of Law.
1. SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 19-22 (2002)
(hereinafter “GORDON”).
2. Id. at 24-25 (“In Ohio, Missouri and Illinois, neighbors who initially
welcomed the Mormons soon became their enemies. . . .  [B]loc voting, forming a 
private militia, and dealing exclusively with approved merchants . . ., combined 
with rumors of sexual irregularities, Mormons’ aggressive proselytizing, and their 
apparently unquestioning obedience to Smith, made Mormon settlements
unpopular with nearby residents.”).
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Mormon convictions grew more intense.3  Through it all, Professor 
Gordon’s primary emphasis is focused with admirable
concentration on the institution of polygamy, or “plural marriage” 
as practiced by the 19th century Mormons.
Professor Gordon’s research is detailed and impeccable.  Her 
narrative evokes, without succumbing to, the passions raised on all 
sides of the various controversies involved.  She induces the reader 
to experience the emotional reality of much that occurred, while 
maintaining a significant degree of even-handedness in her
descriptions.
Still, after having finished reading this excellent narrative, it is 
fair for one to ask oneself, “Exactly what is this a history of?”
I. A PARTICULARIZED SCOPE FOR PROFESSOR GORDON’S NARRATIVE
This is not a general history of Mormon polygamy, or even a 
legal or political history of Mormon polygamy.  This is because a 
key and paramount element of any such history is intentionally left 
substantially uncovered.  Professor Gordon’s narrative basically
ends with the Supreme Court’s decision in Late Corp. of the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States,4 which upheld the so-
called Edmunds-Tucker Act,5 directing the federal escheat of 
substantially all the property of the Mormon church.  The book 
briefly mentions, but does not give any substantial attention to, the 
ensuing events,6 in which the entering State of Utah “forever 
prohibited” the practice of polygamy as a condition for its
admission into the union.7
3. Id. at 58-59 (“The ‘Reformation’, as it is commonly termed, entailed a 
massive (re)commitment by the faithful . . . .  Mormon sermons grew hyperbolic, 
some even including topics such as the infamous doctrine of ‘blood atonement’ 
(or the theory that only the shedding of the sinner’s blood could atone for some 
sins).”).
4. 136 U.S. 1 (1890).
5. Ch. 397, 24 Stat. 635 (1887).
6. After having discussed the first Late Corporation case at length, Gordon 
briefly describes the 1890 “Manifesto” issued by Wilford Woodruff, whom she 
characterizes as “the last of the Mormon presidents to have made the great 
journey with Brigham Young.” GORDON, supra note 1, at 220.  According to 
Gordon, Woodruff’s statement was a capitulation on the subject of polygamy, 
which “assured all concerned that he would no longer advise the faithful to 
engage in unlawful practices.” Id.  There is no substantial further development of 
how this “capitulation” was effectuated, ensuing political developments regarding
the admission of Utah as a state, or the resulting effects on Mormon doctrine.
7. The Act of Congress that enabled the admission of Utah into the union as 
a state contained as one of its conditions a requirement that in Utah  “polygamous 
2
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A complete political and legal history of Mormon polygamy 
would address this ultimate phase of the institution in detail.  As 
Gordon acknowledges, prior to 1890, there had been many
attempts by the federal authorities and others to expunge polygamy 
in the Mormon territories, but all had failed.8  There must have 
been factors at work regarding the ultimate renunciation that were 
not present in the earlier efforts that caused the capitulation to be 
eventually effective.  Perhaps there were elements of Mormon life 
and culture that facilitated the ultimate renunciation of polygamy
in spite of the pain and disruption that it no doubt caused.  These, 
however, are not treated at length in this narrative.9
All this is understandable when one realizes that the intended 
scope of this book is somewhat narrower than a complete legal 
history of Mormon polygamy.  Instead, Professor Gordon’s
enterprise is more subtle.  She includes in the opening paragraphs 
of the book a brief description of her focus, but the busy reader 
might well pass over it without realizing its significance in
delineating the scope of what is to follow.  Professor Gordon states 
that her book is “about the efforts of the 18th century participants 
in the battle over Mormon polygamy (or plural marriage) to
explain ‘why the practice of polygamy . . . created a constitutional 
conflict over the meaning and scope of democracy in the United 
States.’”10
That is, her subject is the legal and political battle of words 
and ideas that surrounded the practice of Mormon polygamy, and 
in particular the effects of this battle of words on constitutional
doctrine, while the institution of polygamy was in effect.  She wants 
or plural marriages are forever prohibited.”  Utah Enabling Act, Ch. 138, § 3 
(First), 28 Stat. 107, 108 (1894).
8. Gordon describes various strategies used by polygamous Mormons to 
defeat the attempted enforcement of anti-polygamist laws and policies.  Chief 
among them were the practice of defendants’ going “Underground,” which 
(according to Gordon) amounted to massive games of hide-and-seek, in which the 
Mormon faithful would assist in secretly sheltering accused polygamists. GORDON,
supra note 1, at 158-59.  Another “defense strategy” was the resort to
“forgetfulness” by witnesses in legal proceedings, particularly Mormon women. Id.
at 161.
9. Gordon discusses isolated factors, such as the controversy that she
describes as involving the seating of Mormon Senator Reed Smoot in 1907, as 
contributing to a process in which “Mormon leaders gradually, but with increasing 
conviction, internalized an anti-polygamous ethic.” GORDON, supra note 1, at 136-
37.  These are particular incidents, however, rather than part of a comprehensive 
overview.
10. GORDON, supra note 1, at 1.
3
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to focus on the rhetorical and strategic argumentation, abroad in 
the land but also specifically in the Supreme Court, through which 
the polygamy battle was fought.  Her interest is the impact of the 
debate on the language and ideas of the Constitution, rather than 
the entire legal ramifications of Mormon polygamy per se.  This is a 
reasonable focus of attention, and it affords several interesting 
observations about the development of constitutional doctrine.
For example, lay readers may not be fully familiar with the 
predicament of federalism in which the early Saints found
themselves.  Professor Gordon reports that while the early
Mormons were still residents largely of the Midwestern states, they 
seized on the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause to shield them 
from the depredations of hostile state governments.  They were 
disappointed to learn, however, that at the time the clause was held 
only to limit the federal government and not the states.  They 
learned first-hand the limitations of a federal structure, in which an 
oppressed minority could look only to its own local state
government for the protection of local civil rights.11
Then, upon the migration to the Great Salt Lake Basin, the 
early Saints surely felt that they could develop their own local 
religious culture free from interference.12  However, in their 
particular local circumstances, they were residents of an as-yet
unincorporated federal territory, rather than a fully sovereign state.
The Constitution is quite explicit that the federal Congress has 
substantial authority over the governance of federal territories.13
Additionally, at the time of the Mormon migration, the
Reconstruction Congresses contained ample quantities of
legislators hostile to the Mormon cause.
As Professor Gordon tells the story, it must have been
especially frustrating for the newly-settled Mormons to learn that 
whereas they had earlier been subject to the disfavor of hostile state 
governments, constitutional federalism was not to spare them from 
11. GORDON, supra note 1, at 8-9 (“Mormons . . . did not have a clear
understanding of state constitutional law. . . . They were amazed and mortified 
that the Constitution failed to protect them or to avenge their suffering at the 
hands of local populations.”).
12. GORDON, supra note 1, at 9 (“After they fled westward in the late 1840s, 
Mormon leaders claimed that the same principles that left them exposed to the 
vicissitudes of local majority rule in the states, dictated that they had the same 
rights to self-governance in their own jurisdiction - the Territory of Utah.”).
13. U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 3 (“The Congress shall have Power to dispose of 
and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other 
Property belonging to the United States.”).
4
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a hostile federal Congress even as they attempted to establish their 
own territory.14  Later critics would call situations such as this a 
“double bind.”15
Professor Gordon’s work is especially valuable in describing 
dynamics such as these.  The emphasis on constitutional discourse 
permeates much of the book.  Indeed, most of the substantive 
discussion in the volume addresses one point or another relevant to 
two key Supreme Court cases and the statutes they addressed.  The 
later of these two, already referenced,16 was the Late Corp. of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints case, addressing the
constitutionality of the Edmunds-Tucker Act.17  The earlier was the 
more broadly famous, Reynolds v. United States,18 addressing the 
constitutionality of the Morrill Act,19 Congress’s first attempt to 
outlaw polygamy in the Mormon territories.20
II. POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS OF A BROADER PERSPECTIVE
As valuable as the particularized focus of the volume is, it has 
several shortcomings.  The first such shortcoming was suggested 
earlier,21 and can be addressed in the terms of Gordon’s own 
enterprise.  Since the book does not cover the eventual retraction 
of polygamy as an institution, no insight is gained concerning 
14. GORDON, supra note 1, at 9 (“And yet Utah was a territory, and thus 
neither a state nor entirely under federal control.  Territories occupied an 
ambiguous and changeable place in the legal order, for although they clearly were 
not states (yet), they also were presumed to have the power to become states.
Territories were subject to federal organization as political entities.  But it was not 
clear how much of the states’ power to govern themselves they acquired after 
organization but before statehood.”).
15. E.g., EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 58 (1990) 
(referencing a literary and cultural tradition that, by incorporating at the same 
time elements that are simultaneously homophobic and homoerotic, partakes of a 
“double-binding” character).
16. See supra notes at notes 4-5 and accompanying text (briefly describing the 
Edmunds-Tucker Act).
17. The Late Corporation case, and the relationship between the 19th century
Mormon church and the ownership and management of property, which the case 
chiefly involves, are the primary topics in Chapter 6 of Gordon’s Book, titled “The
Marital Economy.”  (GORDON, at 183-220.)
18. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
19. Ch. 126, 12 Stat. 501 (1862).
20. The Reynolds decision is the primary focus of Chapter 4 of Gordon’s book, 
titled “Law and Patriarchy at the Supreme Court.” GORDON, supra note 1, at 119-45.
21. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (noting the possibility that
elements of Mormon perspectives might have facilitated the ultimate renunciation 
of polygamy).
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whatever changes the retraction might have worked in Mormon 
legal and political attitudes.  Further, no points are made regarding 
any underlying aspects of the earlier Mormon cause that might 
have presaged or facilitated the ultimate retraction.
There are two additional shortcomings, however, that arise out 
of the slightly insular nature of the book’s focus.  Broadly stated, 
Professor Gordon’s narrative does not address any connection that 
the Mormon polygamy controversy might have with contemporary 
concerns in the current political life of the United States.  More 
specifically, there are at least two significant issues in modern 
American political and legal life to which the historical question of 
Mormon polygamy might well be relevant.  Professor Gordon steers 
substantially clear of both of them.
The first of these is the current controversy over same-sex
marriage.  This dispute is now being argued in courtrooms and 
state legislatures all over the country, and has many of the same 
emotional, moral, sexual and political connotations that the
Mormon polygamy dispute engendered.  It is somewhat remarkable 
that a book about Mormon polygamy published in 2002 has no 
substantive discussion of these parallels, or the same-sex marriage 
issue at all.22
The second is the residual controversy over renegade Mormon 
polygamy itself.  Disaffected bands of religious families who
consider themselves Mormons are continuing to practice polygamy 
in Utah and surrounding states.  They are not part of the
mainstream Mormon church, and are in fact disavowed by the 
church.
Occasionally news reports surface regarding young women 
who “escape” from these polygamist households, and such stories 
cause consternation.23  However, the consternation is usually based 
22. Gordon includes a small handful of brief mentions of same-sex marriage.
GORDON, supra note 1 at 233, 234, 237.  These are fairly summary references, 
however, and appear in the final five pages of the narrative.
23. See, e.g., Michael Janofsky, Young Brides Stir New Outcry on Utah Polygamy,
N.Y. TIMES, February 28, 2003, at A1 (detailing the case of Lu Ann Kingston, who 
was assertedly married at age 15 and left her polygamous household with a police 
escort five years later).  During March 2003, a particularly harrowing set of facts 
was disclosed in the national press regarding the abduction of a 15-year-old Salt 
Lake City girl.  She was assertedly taken from her family’s home at night be a 
crazed vagrant who made his way into the house by cutting through a window 
screen.  Nick Madigan, Kidnap Suspect is Cited in Plan for Eight Wives, N.Y. TIMES,
March 15, 2003, at A1, A13.  The alleged abductor and his wife kept the child for 
nine months, before they were apprehended and the child was returned to her 
6
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on the age of these young women, and centers on ideas of child 
protection against abuse.  From reading the news reports, one gets 
the idea that the concerns might be different, and less intense, if 
the complaining women were in their late twenties or early thirties.
In the modern U.S. jurisprudential world, a household
composed of mutually-consenting adults engaged in private, non-
violent and non-commercial sexual relations as part of an
established pattern of family life might receive a more favorable 
reception than it did in the mid-19th century.  This is in substantial 
part because in the last thirty-five years the Supreme Court has 
developed a constitutional right to privacy concerning matters of 
marriage, procreation and family life.
If the practice of Mormon polygamy in the 19th century were
judged against the privacy line of cases that are authoritative today, 
Mormon polygamy might have fared somewhat better in popular 
perceptions, and even in the courts.  And, indeed, it is conceivable 
that at some point in the future a modern renegade Mormon
polygamous family might successfully challenge state polygamy laws 
on the basis of the federal right to constitutional privacy.  Gordon 
makes no substantial mention of the modern constitutional right to 
privacy or its potential application in this context.
The remainder of this Review will focus primarily on
developing the first of these extrinsic comparisons, that having to 
do with same-sex marriage.  However, at the end of the discussion it 
will become apparent that many of the ideas that have been 
generated in this connection relate also to the issue of modern 
polygamy.  It is hoped that a connecting thread will be discerned 
between these two extrinsic points, and that a degree of coherence 
and rationality can be observed as a result of the impassioned and 
dedicated labors of so many people for so many years.
III. TWO DISTINCT EPOCHS
Contrasting the 19th century Mormon polygamy debate with 
family.  The wife of the accused perpetrator asserted in press reports that the girl 
had been taken to serve as the first of her husband’s next eight wives.  The man
involved claimed to be following in the line of the Mormon prophets.  However, it 
seems clear that, assuming the truth of the allegations, the couple involved was 
psychologically deranged.  It would be unfair to regard their behavior as
representative or characteristic of all modern polygamists claiming to be
Mormons.  Modern polygamous unions most often take place with the consent 
and wish of the families involved; violent abductions and kidnappings from family 
homes are not characteristic of the practice.
7
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the current debate about same-sex marriage makes one aware of 
the different historical epochs in which these debates were carried 
out.  The differing epochs might be defined in the following terms.
The first epoch was that inhabited by the Latter-Day Saints, as 
described in part by Professor Gordon.  It would have begun at 
least by 1843 with Joseph Smith’s receipt of the “Revelation on 
Celestial Marriage,”24 continuing through the public proclamation 
of that imperative in 1852 , continuing with the Reynolds decision in 
1862, and ending (as Gordon might see it) with the decision in the 
Late Corp. case.
The epoch inhabited by the advocates of same-sex marriage 
would be seen as beginning in the late 1960’s or early 1970’s, with 
state cases such as the Minnesota Supreme Court’s 1971 decision in 
Baker v. Nelson,25 denying a marriage license to a same-sex couple.
It would continue through the issuance of more sympathetic state-
court cases, such as Baehr v. Lewin26 and Baker v. State,27 the first state 
high-court decisions finding favorably for the prospect of same-sex
marriage.  It would also pass through the DOMA movement, in 
which many state governments, and the federal government, passed 
legislation in the mold of “Defense of Marriage Acts.”28  Then, it 
would end at some undetermined point in the future, when the 
same-sex marriage controversy is resolved.
An explicit comparison between the Mormon attempts to 
preserve polygamy and modern attempts to establish recognition 
for same-sex marriage may strike some readers as far-fetched, and 
perhaps insensitive to those sympathetic with the Mormon cause.  It 
is true that there are significant differences between the
circumstances of Mormon polygamy in the 19th century and those 
of the modern activists for same-sex marriage, and some of these 
will be discussed below.  However, there are also many similarities.
The first and most direct similarity is that the Mormon
polygamists, like the modern activists, were espousing a form of 
sexual union that was non-conformist, and involved sexual
practices that, at least among those of European ancestry in North 
America, were innovative.  It is true that there were examples of 
24. Professor Gordon adds that “[r]umors at the time, and evidence of 
experimentation disclosed by subsequent research, date the practice considerably 
earlier than 1843 . . ..” GORDON, supra note 1, at 22.
25. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).
26. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
27. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
28. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (the Federal “DOMA”).
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polygamy in other cultures, and in Biblical texts.  But, the practice 
of more or less open polygamy among Anglo-European settlers on 
this continent was something new.  Similarly, the open assertion 
that same-sex couples should be permitted to marry legally is 
characteristic of a non-conformist approach to sexual behavior and, 
upon adoption, would amount to an innovation in the relationship 
of law and sexuality.
Related to this similarity, but distinct from it, is the observation 
that, beyond the sexual aspect of polygamous relations, the early 
Mormons were taking a different view from society of what could 
constitute the legally-sanctioned structure of a marriage.  Whereas 
prior to their arrival on the scene, marriage in the United States
was viewed virtually universally as the union of one man and one 
woman, most Mormons during the relevant period viewed marriage 
also as something that could take place between one man and two 
or more women.  Their view amounted to a re-definition of the
structure of marriage.  This, of course, could also be said of
modern advocates of same-sex marriage.
Another area of similarity concerns the passionate hostility that 
both sets of non-conformists have met.  As noted earlier, Professor 
Gordon’s narrative includes descriptions of the hostility, including 
armed violence, with which early Mormons were met in the
Midwest.29  Her recounting also contains substantial descriptions of 
the popular literature of the time, chiefly novels, which expressed 
the most vituperative moral condemnation against Mormon
polygamy and the Mormons themselves.  A veritable stable of 
woman authors of the late 19th century seem to have made careers 
out of publishing pulp novels excoriating Mormon polygamy and 
the Mormon faith in general.30  These works appear to have been 
taken seriously, and Professor Gordon’s work tends to indicate that 
much serious political and public discourse was in the same vein.
Similarly, of course, the modern cause of same-sex marriage 
has been roundly condemned on moral grounds.  The success of 
the DOMA legislation in various states and the federal Congress 
and the vigorous denunciations that accompanied activism in
29. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (describing the reception of the 
early Mormons in some Midwestern states and the murder of Joseph Smith).
30. Professor Gordon highlights in particular the work of four female
novelists: METTA VICTOR, MORMON WIVES (1856), MARIA WARD, FEMALE LIFE AMONG
THE MORMONS (1855); ORVILLA BELISLE, MORMONISM UNVEILED (1855); and
ALFREDA EVA BELL, BOADICEA (1855). GORDON, supra note 1, at 29-32.
9
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Hawaii and Vermont when the supreme courts of those states ruled 
favorably regarding same-sex unions are merely some of the most 
concrete examples.  Indeed, of course, one of the ironies in this 
area is that the modern Mormon church has been one of the most 
dedicated opponents to the cause of same-sex marriage in both of 
these states.31
Perhaps most tellingly, both sets of non-conformists were 
viewed by many of their antagonists solely in sexual terms.  The 
19th century critics of Mormon polygamy included many who 
lumped the Mormons in with Fanny Wright, and other
contemporary promoters of “free love.”32  They assumed that 
because many Mormon men engaged in polygamy, the men were 
motivated primarily by licentiousness and a libidinous desire for 
multiple sexual partners.33  It seems far more likely that most 
polygamous husbands among the 19th century Mormons
approached polygamous relations with a strong sense of duty and 
responsibility, and that common sexual avarice would have been 
quite remote from their dominant motivations.
Similarly, opponents of same-sex marriage tend to essentialize 
the gay men and lesbians who would be the most common
participants in such marriages according to sexual behavior.  One 
can form the impression that some critics of same-sex marriage 
believe that the only thing a married same-sex couple would ever 
do together would be to have sex, and that the only reason that 
legal sanction is desired is to validate homosexual relations.  Once 
again, it is more likely that most same-sex couples approach their 
unions with a sense of duty and responsibility.  They want the 
benefits of marriage to promote the security and stability of their 
31. Professor Gordon acknowledges as much during her brief references to 
the same-sex marriage issue. GORDON, supra note 1, at 234 (“The abiding sense of 
pain and persecution that many Mormons bring to the study of their past does 
not . . . make them sympathetic to others’ arguments for reshaping the structure 
of marriage.  In response to the gay marriage movement, for example, the church 
strongly supported the federal Defense of Marriage Act . . ..”); GORDON, supra note 
1, at 237 (“Mormon leaders are now commonly known as vocal opponents of 
polygamy, feminism and gay rights.”).
32. Professor Gordon recounts that Fanny Wright was known as the “Red 
Harlot of Infidelity” for her philosophy of “free love.” GORDON, supra note 1, at 
38. She notes that at least one influential contemporary writer alluded to Wright’s 
doctrines when attacking Mormon polygamy. Id. at 43.
33. GORDON, supra note 1, at 37 (“Exploring the sensual excesses of
dissidents, sensational writers and lecturers satisfied the urge to probe and expose 
the sexual consequences of religious lapse.”).
10
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relations with each other and their children, quite the opposite of a 
desire to facilitate irresponsibility.
Furthermore, both sets of non-conformists, although the basis 
of their non-conformity is rooted in an area of legal responsibility 
allocated to state governments (marriage and family life), have 
been the subject of oppressive legislation at the federal level.  The 
early Mormons were plagued with the Morrill Act and the
Edmunds-Tucker Act, as noted above.34  The modern advocates of 
same-sex marriage have been saddled with DOMA’s, not only in 
numerous state jurisdictions, but in the federal Congress as well.35
In all cases, the federal legislation was meant, not merely to
obstruct the disfavored practices, but to obliterate them as
completely as it was felt the restrictions of federalism would permit.
Finally, the reception of the Supreme Court to practitioners of 
these kinds of non-conformity (until recently in the case of the 
modern activists) has been fairly contemptuous.  Professor
Gordon’s narrative demonstrates that the Mormons received
callously unfavorable treatment from the Court in the two cases on 
which she concentrates: Reynolds v. United States36 and Late Corp. of 
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States.37
Similarly, the callous reception of gay men and lesbians in the case 
of Bowers v. Hardwick38 has long been evident.  (Only recently, with 
the Court’s decision in Romer v. Evans,39 has the Court’s attitude 
been less dismissive, and that development is somewhat
34. See supra notes 5 & 19 and accompanying text respectively (briefly
describing the effects of the legislation).
35. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (referencing the state and 
federal DOMAs as an element of the modern Epoch describing the progress of the 
cause of same-sex marriage).
36. Professor Gordon seems at least mildly exasperated that in the Reynolds
decision the Court virtually ignored the arguments of the Mormons’ attorneys, 
which were based on the limited scope of federal jurisdiction, and focused instead 
on the extent of the Religion Clauses.  She notes that the “carefully crafted. . .
arguments of the Mormons evaporated in Chief Justice Waite’s analysis for the 
Court.” GORDON, supra note 1, at 130.  She maintains that the Court’s treatment
of the Mormons’ argument “misconstrued” their “central constitutional claim.”
Id. at 132.
37. Regarding the Late Corporation case, Professor Gordon seems justifiably 
skeptical of the Court’s reliance on the doctrine of “cy pres”, citing the checkered
history of the doctrine’s application. GORDON, supra note 1, at 216.  She also 
reports with some apparent sympathy the view of the dissenting justices, who 
believed that cy pres should be a solely judicial remedy, rather than a basis for 
Congressional enactment through the Edmunds-Tucker Act. Id. at 218.
38. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
39. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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counterbalanced by Justice Scalia’s fire-breathing dissent40 in the 
case.)
On the other hand, it is true that there are significant
differences between the two sets of non-conformists.  First and 
foremost, the Mormon non-conformists were motivated by the 
dictates of a formal organized religion.  The modern non-
conformists do not operate from a common religious base,
although some religious groups have evinced substantial support 
for their cause.  It is also true that the desire for legal sanction for 
one’s deepest personal commitment strikes chords of spirituality 
and inner meaning that can be religious in character.  However, it 
must be conceded that these dimensions of spirituality and
meaning are not the same social phenomenon as a formal
organized religion.
A major historical distinction would also be that the early 
polygamous Mormons inhabited an area of territory that was
substantially geographically segregated.  The modern activists for 
same-sex marriage are to be found virtually everywhere, in most 
every state in the union, in rural and urban communities alike.
This factor was material in that geographic isolation helped
concentrate the 19th century Mormon community and strengthen 
its ability to resist hostile government and judicial action.  While 
modern gay and lesbian couples do lead lives together, raise
children, and in other respects behave as though they were
married, they do not have a broad expanse of isolated territory to 
inhabit in which their alternative family structures could solidify 
across a large and insular society.
40. 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Justice Scalia incredulously
exclaims near the beginning of his dissent that the Court’s opinion “places the 
prestige of this institution behind the proposition that opposition to
homosexuality is as reprehensible as racial or religious bias.” Id.  He later seems to 
criticize the Court for favoring “special treatment for homosexuals.” Id. at 638.
He maintains that the Court’s perception of the Colorado constitutional
amendment there at issue to be “gay-bashing” is “so false as to be comical.” Id. at 
645.  It is especially ironic in the context of this Review that Justice Scalia also 
attached substantial weight to the case of Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890), in 
which the Court upheld a “test oath” requirement imposed by the Idaho territorial 
legislature, intended to exclude polygamous Mormons from voting. See also
GORDON, supra note 1, at 225-28 (discussing Davis in terms that clearly illustrate 
the intolerance and hostility toward polygamous Mormons evident at the time).
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IV. CONTRASTING CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE OF THE TWO EPOCHS
In addition to the factual and experiential distinctions
described above, the rhetorical dynamics regarding the U.S.
Constitution have differed substantially between the two Epochs.
Although their causes were structurally similar, partisans on each 
side of the debate in each Epoch had different views of the Federal 
Constitution and federal power than partisans of that “side” in the 
other Epoch.
One such distinction involved the textual scope of the
Constitution as viewed by defenders of convention.  Influential 
defenders of sexual convention during the Epoch of Mormon 
polygamy discerned in the text of the Constitution a particularized
notion of marriage that was hostile to the non-conformists.41
According to Professor Gordon’s account, the need for this 
approach was occasioned in part by the fact of Mormon hegemony 
over the Western territories the Mormons occupied.  Since a 
certain degree of local autonomy needed to be conceded to the 
territorial residents, opponents of polygamy needed to find a basis 
in the Federal Constitution for denying the territorial residents 
their freedom on this point.  The assertion was that inherent in the 
Federal Constitution was the idea of the family as a fundamental 
bulwark of political society, and that our Federal Constitution was 
conceived in and built on a particular, monogamous idea of the 
family.  Any state or territory that deviated from this norm would be 
behaving in a way antithetical to the Constitution.42
By contrast, many defenders of sexual convention during the 
modern Epoch are required to perceive the Constitution as being 
41. Professor Gordon describes the position of the novelist Metta Victor.
“The welfare of the country, claimed Victor, depended on Christian monogamy 
and its attendant protection of women in marriage.  The Constitution, she argued, 
was infused with the Christian faith of its founders.” GORDON, supra note 1, at 30.
Professor Gordon also explains, more generally: “The moral compass of the state, 
as anti-polygamist novelists described it, rested on the private relations of husband 
and wife. . . .” Id. at 31.  Professor Gordon also summarizes: “Metta Victor and 
other early anti-polygamists relied on the national Constitution to shield them 
from the power of latter-day revelation and practice.” Id.
42. See GORDON, supra note 1, at 65 (“Utah’s status as a territory provided the 
opportunity to explore and expand federal power, because territories were
technically subject to federal control.  And yet everybody knew that domestic 
relations were matters of local constitutional practice. . . . Republicans cast around 
for suitable theories to justify intervention.”). See also supra note 41 (describing
the connection in the view of some anti-polygamists between conventional
morality and precepts of the Federal Constitution).
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morally neutral on questions of marriage, procreation and family 
life.  That is because the line of privacy-rights cases43 created a 
jurisprudence that already establishes a dimension of individual 
rights in this area.  Modern defenders of sexual convention tend to 
disapprove of the privacy line of cases.  They tend to argue that the 
Constitution does not by its terms contain a substantive protection 
of procreational privacy, and that therefore the Constitution must 
be viewed as neutral on the subject.  Accordingly, this preserves the 
field of private relations in each state to its legislature, and the 
privacy line of cases was largely (if not totally) in their view wrongly 
decided.  However, in taking this approach, modern defenders of 
sexual convention are using an approach essentially opposite to 
that used against the 19th century Mormons.
Another contrast in preferred Constitutional doctrine between 
these Epochs is the “flip side” of the first contrast described above.
This contrast involved the proper role of federalism.  The advocates 
of the early Mormon non-conformists viewed the Federal
Constitution as a force that should allow for substantial state and 
territorial autonomy.  That is, in their view the Constitution rightly 
would remain neutral in areas of marriage and allow the Western 
territories in which the Mormons lived to adopt for themselves 
their own legal structures regarding marriage and family life.
The non-conformists of the modern Epoch, on the other 
hand, tend to use the Federal Constitution as a “sword,” rather 
than a “shield.”  They view that document as a tool with which to 
advance their conception of individual rights.  From their
perspective, the values of the Constitution are anything but neutral 
on questions of marriage and family life.
Part of the explanation for this difference is traceable to the 
control that the 19th century Mormons had over their Western 
territories. Since they had effective control over this land area, they 
43. The modern privacy line of cases began, of course, with Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), invalidating a state statute that prohibited the use 
of certain contraceptives as violative of “a right of privacy older than the Bill of 
Rights” that protected the marital decision to use contraceptives.  381 U.S. at 486.
The applicability of the right of privacy to other situations involving contraceptives
was extended in cases such as Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) and Carey v.
Population Services, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).  It was also extended to decisions
regarding abortion in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  An early opinion that 
serves as a precursor to this line of cases was Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 
(1942), in which the Court asserted that “Marriage and procreation are
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race,” and characterized this 
interest as “one of the basic civil rights of man.”  316 U.S. at 541.
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were in a position to assert the virtues of a federalism that left 
authority over marriage and family life with states or local
governments.  The activists of the later Epoch, having no
geographic localization, are not able to use that argument.
The primary part of the explanation for this contrast in
Constitutional perspective is the intervening development of the 
privacy-rights doctrine itself.  It is because the modern Supreme 
Court has developed the privacy line of cases that the non-
conformists of the two Epochs have such divergent views of the 
values of the Constitution.  The modern non-conformists tend to 
view the Constitution as a safeguard of individual liberty because 
the Court has established that a right to privacy protects individual 
choices regarding marriage, procreation and family life.
The Mormon non-conformists of the earlier Epoch did not 
experience a Constitution interpreted by this line of cases, so they 
were not able to use the document as a positive enforcer of 
individual liberty in the area of marital and family privacy.  They 
instead could assert that then-dominant notions of federalism 
should keep the federal government out of local decisions about 
marriage and family.  They could perceive the value of the
Constitution in this respect as being largely a bulwark against 
federal involvement.
V. A POSSIBLE THREAD CONNECTING TWO EPOCHS
If the privacy line of cases is the primary basis for this
difference in favored Constitutional doctrines, how might the 
arguments of the earlier Mormons have changed if the privacy line 
of cases had been decided during, or prior to, their Epoch?  This is 
something we cannot know, given the mutual interdependence of 
historical and cultural events.  However, a far more concrete 
question might well be, given the privacy line of cases, at some 
point could a group of modern renegade Mormons assert the 
privacy line of cases against a state prosecution under bigamy or 
polygamy statutes?  These cases have been decided during their 
era, and are completely available to them, unlike the 19th century 
Mormons.
Initially, the question may strike some as fanciful.  It is not 
unusual, for example, for Supreme Court justices to use polygamy 
or bigamy statutes as examples of still-permissible state regulations 
of marriage when discussing the modern privacy right.  However, 
no Supreme Court decision since the privacy line was developed 
15
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has squarely held that statutes against polygamy are necessarily 
valid as against a privacy challenge.
There is of course the adverse precedent in Reynolds v. United
States.44  However, the Reynolds decision held only that Mormon 
polygamy was not protected by the First Amendment Free Exercise 
Clause.  That issue might even be viewed today as having been 
correctly decided, in light of the modern Court’s holding in
Employment Division v. Smith.45  Assuming that the Morrill Act’s terms 
were neutral and generally applicable, there might well be a strong 
argument even today that such a federal statute should survive a 
Free-Exercise challenge, at least as long as Employment Division v. 
Smith remains the law.
However, the mere possibility that the Free-Exercise analysis in 
Reynolds arrived at a correct result does not mean that the same 
result should be reached if the same facts are analyzed on the basis 
of the Due-Process right to privacy. The hypothetical modern 
renegade group of polygamous Mormons would not succeed under 
a Free-Exercise challenge to the enforcement of a bigamy statute 
against them.  This does not necessarily mean they would, or 
should, be unsuccessful with a 14th Amendment Due Process 
argument.
If the privacy line of cases was correctly decided, it must be 
because there is something basic and fundamentally important 
about the individual’s autonomy over his or her familial
relationships.  The State cannot generally decide for a person 
whether to have children, whether to maintain or curtail fertility or 
virility, and what kinds of extended family relationships can
constitute a household.  This fundamental interest in autonomy is 
something that is constant, as true for one Epoch as for another.
To be sure, social and political circumstances may change and be 
very different from one period to another.  Perhaps considerations 
of social stability prevent the individual’s interest in autonomy from 
being completely free during certain epochs, but that does not 
mean that the interest in freedom is less strong.
It certainly appears that certain state governments are
acknowledging expanded applications of the individual’s right to 
make his or her own choices in the areas of marriage, procreation 
and family life.  In some cases, there is and no doubt will be, legal 
44. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
45. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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recognition of the right of a person to marry, or effectively marry, 
another person of the same sex.
This is to some degree a revolutionary development, given the 
hostility in governmental circles that would until recently, and in 
some cases still, greets the idea of serious same-sex relationships.
But at least some states have acknowledged, and more will, the 
basic human need to live in marital and family structures that are 
meaningful and fulfilling to those who inhabit them.  This is 
beginning to be accepted now for those in same-sex relationships.
It was not accepted in the 19th century for the early Mormons.
This may have been because the dominant political and social 
visions of the time could not conceive of countenancing their 
structures without threatening the larger society.
However, there are now states and localities wherein large 
numbers of adult gay men and lesbians are living openly as marital 
or quasi-marital couples with families, and these states and localities 
are continuing to thrive.  Their example may, and perhaps should, 
cause a re-examination of the extent to which plural marriage 
among adults actually does threaten civil society.  The tenacity of 
that institution over time may speak to the sincerity and personal 
commitment in which it is rooted, at least in the hearts of many.
While the basis for choosing this familial structure can be
grounded in religion, it is by no means necessary for one’s idea of 
one’s own family to be religiously based in order for that idea to be 
of fundamental importance in defining one’s own life.
Professor Gordon’s narrative leaves no doubt as to the sincerity 
and commitment of the early Mormon practitioners of polygamy.
It is difficult to read Professor Gordon’s account without
experiencing some degree of sympathy for the Mormon population 
that was so pervasively the object of scorn and condemnation from 
much of the rest of the country.  After all, this was a population 
that had deep convictions about their relationships with one
another and their God, and most today would not doubt their 
sincerity or integrity in attempting to live their ideals.  If the 
societal restrictions of their time forbade their living according to 
their chosen precepts, perhaps as those restrictions change
character, those choosing potentially analogous precepts can be 
accorded a more welcoming treatment in the future.
The thread of respect for individual autonomy in defining 
one’s marital and family relationships seems to be extending into 
new areas in the modern American legal landscape.  A perspective
17
Winer: A Tale of Two Epochs and a Threat That May Still Run True
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2003
BOOK_REVIEW_WINER_FORMATTED 3/28/2003 12:00 AM
1536 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:4
of understanding could well ensue for practitioners of a form of 
plural marriage as a result of this development, providing that 
others can view them with a sympathetic perspective.  It is the 
sympathy that one can experience for the early Saints from reading 
Professor Gordon’s book that may be one of its most significant 
values.
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